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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 1997, the United States Supreme Court considered a constitutional 
challenge to a Washington statute that criminalized acts of deliberate assistance of 
another in committing suicide.1  The Court ruled that an asserted right to physician 
assisted suicide was not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.2  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for 
the Court, concluded the influential decision with a strong statement: “the opinion 
should not restrict the continuation of the open debate in our society about all aspects 
of physician assisted suicide.”3 
The issue of how to care for the terminally ill patient, whether by use of palliative 
care techniques, a medical treatment process placing the relief of pain as the primary 
care goal, or by allowing the patient to voluntarily end their life, has been enriched 
by the far-reaching implications of the court’s decision.4  Timothy Quill, M.D., 
published an influential article in the New England Journal of Medicine which 
frames the issue of physician assisted suicide.5  Dr. Quill wrote about his patient 
Diane who had recovered from several difficult life circumstances only to discover 
that she had acute myelomonocytic leukemia.6  Dr. Quill described the woman as an 
                                                                
1Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
2Id. at 702. 
3Id. at 735. 
4Joan Felice Raymond, Life and Death Choices, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER SUNDAY 
MAGAZINE, October 16, 1999, at 9. 
5Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity, A Case of Individualized Decision Making, NEW 
ENG. J. MED., Mar. 7, 1991, at 691. 
6Id. at 692 (Myelomonocytic leukemia is an acute or chronic disease involving the spleen 
or bone marrow characterized by an abnormal increase in the number of leukocytes in the 
tissue of the body.). 
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“incredibly clear, at times brutally honest thinker and communicator” who had 
finally taken complete control of her life with a strong sense of independence and 
self-esteem.7  Faced with the prospect of a fifty percent survival rate involving 
extensive chemotherapy treatments and other considerably intrusive and complicated 
medical care, Diane, with the support of her family, decided not to undergo the 
recommended therapy.8  Dr. Quill stated that she wanted to live her remaining time 
with her family outside of the hospital.9 
After considerable discussions between Dr. Quill and Diane about her care, 
Diane expressed the importance of the need and value of maintaining control of 
herself and her dignity over the upcoming months.10  Dr. Quill wrote “that Diane 
expressed that when the time came, she wanted to take her life in the least painful 
way possible.”11  A short time later, Dr. Quill prescribed barbiturates after carefully 
considering the brief conversation between the two about Diane’s trouble sleeping.12  
Dr. Quill noted that it was evident to him that Diane then felt secure knowing that if 
the time came she would be able to voluntarily end the suffering at her moment of 
choice.13  Diane did take the medications and quietly passed away at home with her 
family one hour after ingesting the drugs.14  Dr. Quill wrote: “[s]uffering can be 
lessened to some extent, but in no way eliminated or made benign, by careful 
intervention of a competent, caring physician, given current social constraints.”15   
This Note will examine current issues pertaining to the medical care of the 
terminally ill individual, particularly with respect to palliative care and how the 
continuum of medical care incorporates the voluntary termination of a patient’s life.  
Part II of this Note will look at the decision reached in Washington v. Glucksberg 
and how the Supreme Court has contributed to the molding of care for the terminally 
ill.  Part III will review relevant aspects of end of life care concepts and their 
relationship and impact upon the assisted suicide alternative.  Any analysis of 
physician assisted suicide must include the evolution of Oregon’s legislative 
approach to the topic.16  Oregon is the only state which provides terminally ill 
citizens the option of assisted suicide by legislative initiative, viz., the Death with 
Dignity Act.17  The Act will be reviewed at length in Part IV. 
                                                                
7Id. 
8Id.  
9Id. at 693. 
10Quill, supra note 5, at 694. 
11Id. at 692. 
12Id. 
13Id. 
14Id. 
15Quill, supra note 5, at 694. 
16OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800 (2000) (The statute is titled The Oregon Death with Dignity 
Act, and became law on October 27, 1997.). 
17Id. 
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The final portion of this note will take a hard look at how the United States 
Congress has addressed the issue of care of the terminally ill with such initiatives as 
the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998.18  The 106th Congress is also 
considering legislation to promote pain management and palliative care under the 
Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999.19  However well intended this legislation is, the 
proposed law may drastically impact Oregon’s physician assisted suicide law and 
could repress the possible improvements needed in palliative care by physicians.  
This Note will conclude with the proposition that physician assisted suicide, not 
euthanasia, is merely an option in the continuum of care for the terminally ill patient.  
When all practical and available medical procedures fail to provide the terminally ill 
patient with comfort and dignity during the final stages of life, the affected patient 
has a medical and, arguably, a legal right to end life with dignity. 
II:  THE SUPREME COURT INFLUENCE UPON HEALTH CARE OF THE TERMINALLY ILL  
Physician assisted suicide began to evolve as a constitutional issue when two 
different United States Courts struck down state statues prohibiting physician 
assisted suicide.20  In Compassion In Dying v. Washington, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals considered a substantive due process attack on a Washington statute 
prohibiting the aiding of another person to commit suicide.21  The Ninth Circuit held 
that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
applied to terminally ill patients who wished to end their life by taking medications 
prescribed by their physician.22  The appellate court reasoned that a person had a 
liberty interest in choosing how and when to die.23  
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Compassion In Dying, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals considered a physicians action in Quill v. Vacco.24  This 
case challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute, similar to the 
Washington law, which also made it a crime to assist someone in committing 
suicide.25  The physicians asserted that because New York allowed a competent 
person to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, which was “essentially similar” to 
physician assisted suicide, that similarly-situated persons were treated differently.26  
                                                                
18The Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998, H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998) (The 
bill was introduced to the House of Representatives on June 5, 1998, and was referred to the 
Committee on the Judiciary, which held hearings on July 14, 1998.  The bill never reached the 
house floor for a vote.). 
19The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999) (The bill was 
introduced to the House of Representatives on June 17, 1999 and was referred to the 
Committee on the Judiciary, which held hearings on June 24, 1999.  The bill passed the House 
by a margin of 271 to 156.). 
20Compassion In Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996). 
21Id. at 838. 
22Id. at 793. 
23Id. at 816. 
2480 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996). 
25Id. 
26Id. at 718. 
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In reversing a district court decision, the court of appeals held that the New York 
statute did not treat competent persons equally in the final stages of life, and 
therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause.27 
The Supreme Court consolidated and reviewed the Ninth Circuit decision in 
Compassion In Dying v. Washington and the Second Circuit decision in Quill.28  The 
issue before the Supreme Court in Glucksberg involved the existence of a liberty 
interest in selecting the manner and time in which an individual may die.29  In Quill, 
the Court considered whether the New York law prohibiting physician assisted 
suicide was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.30  Thus, the constitutional 
review focused upon the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to an individual’s 
right to voluntarily terminate life with the assistance of a physician.31 
In Glucksberg, the action was brought by three terminally ill plaintiffs, four 
physicians and the non-profit Washington organization, Compassion In Dying.32  
The three terminally ill patients had died before the Court’s decision, which 
illustrates the important nature of the right to die at a time selected by the 
individual.33  Compassion In Dying is a non-profit organization that counsels people 
considering physician assisted suicide and is a strong supporter of an individual’s 
right to die in Washington.34 
The respondents asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 
extended a personal choice by a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to consent 
to and to commit suicide with the assistance of a physician.35  The Court provided 
two lines of reasoning in ruling that no such liberty interest was protected by the 
Constitution.  First, the Court concluded that the liberty interest to end life 
voluntarily was not a fundamental right which was so deeply rooted in the nation’s 
history and tradition deserving of protection under the Due Process Clause.36  The 
Court analyzed the physician assisted suicide issue based upon whether the right to 
end life was so rooted in the traditions and consciousness of the people that the right 
was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.37  The Court determined that the 
nation’s legal history of prohibiting suicide, coupled with the fact that many states 
had enacted statutes making it a crime to help someone kill himself or herself was 
sufficient to find the issue of physician assisted suicide lacking the muster to grant 
                                                                
27Id. at 731. 
28Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702. 
29Simon M. Canick, Constitutional Aspects of Physican-Assisted Suicide After Lee v. 
Oregon, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 69 (1997). 
30Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 798 (1997). 
31Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702. 
32Id. 
33Id. 
34Id. at 708.  
35Id. at 723. 
36Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. 
37Id. 
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Constitutional protection.38  Secondly, the Court found that Washington’s ban on 
physician assisted suicide was rationally related to a legitimate state government 
interest.39  Even though the Court’s decision was unanimous in both cases, careful 
examination of the written opinions of the Court and their suggests that the Court 
was supportive of the right to die.  The Court was not about to overturn centuries of 
legal rulings and establish a fundamental right to end life without greater 
justification.  The rulings arguably may indicate judicial support for the voluntary 
termination of life under the direction of a physician in more appropriate 
circumstances. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Washington v. Glucksberg 
provides many indications of the Court’s concern and understanding for the 
terminally ill patient’s choice to end his or her life.  The Court recognized that 
because of the advances made in medicine, Americans were more likely to die in 
institutions from chronic illnesses.40  The Court acknowledged that the public was 
very concerned about the issue of protecting an individual’s dignity and 
independence in the final stages of life.41  One may consider whether this is a signal 
by the Court that death with dignity may eventually evolve into a constitutionally 
protected right.42  In another context, the Court did not consider the right to refuse 
medical treatment as a constitutionally protected right after review of only one case; 
on the contrary, the recognition of the right was an evolutionary process which took 
many circumstances and legal determinations to culminate in the protection outlined 
by the Court in Cruzan v. Missouri.43  In Cruzan, the Court held a competent person 
had a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment.44 
The Court in Glucksberg took notice that many states were “currently engaged in 
serious, thoughtful examinations for physician assisted suicide and other similar 
issues.”45  The Court was concerned about the potential dangers a protection of a 
right to physician assisted suicide might create; such a sudden change in public 
policy would outweigh any benefit achieved.46  The legalization of assisted suicide 
could create considerable risks of social harm to individuals who are ill and 
vulnerable to the influence of third parties.47  These individuals could be at risk of 
coercion, or they might make the decision to end their lives because of pressure from 
a third party.  One could argue that if the potential dangers of physician assisted 
                                                                
38Id. at 728. 
39Id. 
40Id. at 716. 
41Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 716. 
42David A. Pratt, Too Many Physicians: Physician Assisted Suicide After 
Glucksberg/Quill, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 161, 221 (1999). 
43Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 302 (1990). 
44Id. 
45Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719. 
46Id. 
47Id. 
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suicide failed to materialize, the public policy argument of social harm becomes less 
influential under the Court’s analysis.  The Court’s public policy position could also 
weaken by a shift in the public demand for increased improvements in the care of the 
terminally ill.  Therefore, the public policy argument may prove less of a legal 
ground to support a constitutional rejection of the voluntary right to terminate life.  
Of greater significance to the Court may be the prospect that, as medical experts 
predict, the population of aging baby boomers will increase its demand for 
improvements in how we die.48 
The majority in Glucksberg took the position that the Court has historically been 
reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because the “guideposts 
for responsible decision making in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.”49  
It would follow that with a progressive expansion of care and improvement in the 
methods of care for the terminally ill, combined with a greater precision to diagnose 
and treat the symptoms of a terminal illness, one could expect to see that the 
guideposts for responsible decision-making beginning to emerge.  Such an evolution 
will help pave the way for a more comfortable legal base from which to establish 
conditions for physician assisted suicide.  Oregon’s experience with the Death with 
Dignity Act, reviewed later in this Note, may provide a wealth of information to 
better determine protective guideposts required by the Court. 
The concurring opinions of Justices Souter, O’Connor, Stevens, and Breyer offer 
support for the position that the Court’s posture may be subject to a future shift.50  In 
each of the concurring opinions the Justices acknowledge the importance of how a 
person faces death and that many people will spend his or her last days in pain and 
discomfort.51  The concurring opinions also highlight each Justice’s concern for 
avoiding severe pain during the final stages of a terminal illness and in the manner in 
which the terminally ill patient may be forced to suffer during the last days of life.52  
Each Justice recognized the need of the terminally ill patient to die with dignity.53  
Arguably, the Supreme Court seems to be concerned that the terminally ill patient 
must have available reasonable palliative care for the treatment of severe pain.54  
Justice Souter’s opinion acknowledged that providing terminally ill patients, such as 
the respondents, with prescribed medication that went beyond the relief of pain and 
hastened death would be consistent with medical standards.55  He agreed that the 
Washington statute prevented a physician from exercising his best professional 
judgment in prescribing medications to terminally ill patients in dosages that would 
enable the patients to end their lives.56  Justice Souter accepted that physician 
                                                                
48Raymond, supra note 4, at 16. 
49Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 
50See generally id. at 736-92. 
51Id. at 716. 
52See generally id. at 736-92. 
53Id. 
54Pratt, supra note 42, at 174. 
55Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 753. 
56Id. 
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assisted suicide would fall within the accepted tradition of medical care in our 
society by relating the physician’s role in abortion cases to that of the role in assisted 
suicide: as a role ministering to the needs of the patient.57  Justice Souter wrote: 
The patients here sought not only an end to pain (which they might have 
had, although perhaps at the price of stupor) but an end to their short 
remaining lives with a dignity that they believed would be denied them by 
powerful pain medication, as well as by their consciousness of 
dependency and helplessness as they approached death.58 
Souter concluded that during the period of time when death was imminent, to end 
one’s life is generally accepted as a proper exercise of autonomy over one’s body 
with a recognized Constitutional protection.59  Justice Souter concurred because of 
the substantial nature of the disagreement regarding the facts on assisted suicide and 
the alternatives for resolving the dispute.60  One can conclude from Justice Souter’s 
position that there are patients suffering from a terminal illness that may have a 
constitutionally protected right to end life.  However, the patient’s circumstances in 
Glucksberg were not persuasive enough for the Court to extend due process 
protection. 
One of the more striking statements made by Justice Souter, which contributed to 
his position against assisted suicide, was his concern that mistaken decisions may 
result from inadequate palliative care, or a terminal prognosis that was made in 
error.61  Souter stated that the day may come when one side of the assisted suicide 
argument will prevail, but his considerable disagreement with the facts and the 
choices for solution were sufficient to reject the protection of due process.62  He did 
provide a powerful conclusion to his concurrence when he stated that the facts 
necessary for resolving the issue were not ascertainable through the judicial process, 
but were more likely to be identified through legislative fact-finding and 
experimentation at the state and federal level.63 
Justice O’Connor also wrote a concurring opinion in Glucksberg whereby she 
indicated confidence that the democratic process would identify the necessary 
balance between the interests of the terminally ill who wish to end life, and the 
interests of those who would be influenced to make the same choice by other 
factors.64  She concluded that in such circumstances, the challenge of constructing 
the safeguards to the interests of the terminally ill was best left to “the laboratory of 
the States.”65  Justice O’Connor considered that the States’ interests in protecting the 
                                                                
57Id. at 779. 
58Id. 
59Id. 
60Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 786. 
61Id. 
62Id. 
63Id. 
64Id. at 737. 
65Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737. 
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individuals who were not truly competent or terminally ill were sufficiently 
important to justify laws against physician assisted suicide.66  Again it is apparent 
that some members of the Supreme Court are signaling that the States under their 
sovereign right to regulate medical care may address the assisted suicide issue.  
Similarly, the Court appears to be sending a message that medical care for the 
terminally ill was considered a dominant factor when each Justice reached his or her 
respective decision. 
Equally supportive to the proponents of the right to end life was Justice Stevens’ 
position that he would not rule out the possibility that a patient seeking suicide 
assistance from a physician could prevail in a more “particularized” challenge.67  
Justice Stevens was the most vocally supportive of the voluntary termination of life 
issue, and his use of the term “particularized challenge” may suggest that a more 
specific set of circumstances will be needed in order to gain constitutional protection 
for assisted suicide.68  Stevens joined in the majority’s conclusion that the potential 
harm from granting a liberty interest in assisted suicide was sufficient to support the 
State’s public policy interest.69  Stevens commented that a State such as Washington, 
which authorizes use of the death penalty, has in essence determined that the sanctity 
of life does not require preservation in all instances.70  Stevens stated that 
Washington must also acknowledge that there will be other situations in which 
hastening death is legitimate.71  Justice Stevens was convinced that there are 
instances when the interest is entitled to constitutional protection.72  He also stated 
that end of life decisions were central to personal dignity and autonomy and such 
matters would fall within the protection of the constitution.73  His position focused 
upon the avoidance of intolerable pain and the indignity of living one’s final days 
incapacitated and in agony.74  Justice Stevens acknowledged conceptually that 
patients whose physical pain is inadequately treated will be more likely to request 
assisted suicide.75  He suggested that encouragement for the development and 
endurance of palliative care would prevent some instances of life-terminating 
actions.76  He also indicated that greater use of palliative care would not eliminate all 
pain and suffering.77  However, greater use of palliative care would reduce the 
                                                                
66Id. 
67Id. at 749; see also Pratt, supra note 42, at 174. 
68Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 750. 
69Id. at 741. 
70Id. 
71Id. at 742. 
72Id. 
73Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 744. 
74Id. at 751. 
75Id. at 747. 
76Id. 
77Id. at 748. 
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demand for assisted suicide and under such developments the more “particularized” 
challenge may begin to evolve.78 
Justice Breyer’s concurrence cited the possibility that the right to die with dignity 
may be the legal tradition required for protection under the Due Process Clause.79  
Breyer acknowledged that the core right would be personal control over the manner 
of how one should die, which included the avoidance of unnecessary and severe 
physical suffering.80  Justice Breyer was more direct in his position on the liberty 
interest issue by stating that the avoidance of severe physical pain would have to 
comprise an essential part of any successful constitutional claim.81  He pointed out, 
as did Justice O’Connor, that the laws of Washington and New York did not force a 
dying person to undergo severe physical pain.82  Glucksberg appears to have left 
open the possible extension of constitutional protection for the voluntary right to end 
life.83  How will the Court apply the provisions expounded upon in Glucksberg to a 
patient who has undergone appropriate and extensive palliative care while the severe 
pain is unrelieved to the point of affecting dignity and personal autonomy?  Or, in 
the alternative, if a state has not taken reasonable measures to provide reasonably 
available palliative care for pain, is the state forcing a patient to die with severe 
physical pain and therefore violating his or her right to dignity?  The Court may be 
suggesting that the medical community and the states will need to more aggressively 
and comprehensively address the patients’ need to end life with dignity and absent 
less suffering.  Some suggest that the five Supreme Court Justices were in effect 
saying that palliative care may be a constitutional right.84 
III: IS ASSISTED SUICIDE A CONSEQUENCE OF A LACK OF PALLIATIVE CARE OR IS 
CHOICE THE DOMINANT FACTOR? 
Glucksberg contains some significant implications for the medical care of 
terminally ill patients and the relief of their pain and suffering. The right-to-end-life 
issue before the Court in Glucksberg identified the importance of palliative care for 
the terminally ill patient.85  A report by the Institute of Medicine at the National 
Academy of Science identified the under-treatment of pain and the use of ineffectual 
and intrusive medical procedures that may prolong suffering are major problems in 
end of life care.86  Terminally ill patients are concerned about loss of personal 
                                                                
78Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 750. 
79Id. at 790. 
80Id. 
81Id. at 791. 
82Id. 
83521 U.S. at 735. 
84Alexandra Dylan Lowe, Facing the Final Exit: The U.S. Supreme Court Has Left The 
Issue of Physician Assisted Suicide Up To The States, 83 A.B.A. J. 48, 51 (1997). 
85Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736.  (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that patients living in 
a state where there were no legal barriers to obtaining medication to alleviate suffering will 
have no liberty protection of due process).  The question remains that if a state allows barriers 
to exist or encourages them to develop, will there be a constitutional due process protection? 
86Lowe, supra note 84, at 51. 
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autonomy, loss of control of bodily functions, and the control of severe pain.87  Pain 
at the end of life is the most common reason people seek medical care.88  The 
treatment of pain is often neglected in medical education and in care for the patient. 
The assisted suicide issue has made end of life care the focal point in the decision 
making process of how one dies. 
Assisted suicide has been practiced by physicians without statutory authorization 
or medical protection.89  In April 1998, the Massachusetts Medical Society published 
the results of a 1996 national survey involving 3102 physicians in ten specialty firms 
throughout the country.90  The survey reported that a substantial number of 
physicians in the United States had received requests for assisted suicide, and that 
about six percent complied with the request at least one time.91  The study 
demonstrated that region of practice, religion, and specialty influenced a physician’s 
participation in assisted death.92  The report suggested that the open debate in the 
states of California, Oregon, and Washington may account for the higher frequency 
of assisted suicide requests and physician compliance with such requests in these 
states.93 
The study found that a majority of the patients who requested assisted suicide 
would have met regulatory safeguards similar to a those in Oregon’s statute 
authorizing assisted suicide.94  The study discovered that in a majority of the cases. 
hospitalized patients who received a lethal injection had less than twenty-four hours 
to live and were experiencing severe discomfort or pain.95  The study suggested that 
by delaying treatment of the patients’ pain symptoms, the physician could protect 
against an accusation that he or she was intending to hasten death.96  The report 
                                                                
87Arthur E. Chin, Physician Assisted Suicide In Oregon–The First Year’s Experience, 
NEW ENG. J. MED., Feb. 18, 1999, at 577. 
88Id. at 579. 
89Diane E. Meier, A National Survey of Physician Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the 
United States, NEW ENG. J. MED., Apr. 23, 1998, at 1192. 
90Id. at 1193. 
91Id.  (The study reported that eleven percent of the physicians indicated they would be 
willing under current law to assist a suicide while thirty-six percent would if it were legal.  
The study also reported that seven percent responded that they would provide a lethal injection 
while twenty-four percent reported they would if it were legal.  Seventy percent of the 
prescribed lethal medications were opioids and twenty-five percent were barbiturates.). 
92Id. 
93Id. at 1199. 
94Meier, supra note 89, at 1192.  See also Charles H. Baron, A Model State Act to 
Authorize and Regulate Physician Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, (1996) (stating it 
is consistent with the fundamental values underlying the legal and ethical requirements of 
respect for the right of competent patients to give or withhold consent to any treatment, 
including life-sustaining treatment, and providing an overview of a model act allowing a 
responsible physician to practice assisted suicide and placing a series of responsibilities on 
that physician). 
95Meier, supra note 89, at 1200. 
96Id. 
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recommended additional research to evaluate the possibility that better access to 
palliative care might eliminate some of the requests for physician assisted suicides.97  
The survey also noted that the demand for assisted suicide, and a corresponding 
compliance by a doctor, might differ in communities where palliative care is easily 
accessible, suggesting fewer requests where palliative care is readily available.98  In 
Glucksberg, the Supreme Court also vocalized recognition of these circumstances, 
while suggesting that the legislature was the appropriate body to address the 
palliative care issue.99  
The use of lethal injection seemed to be the method of choice by physicians for 
patients having less that twenty-four hours to live and were experiencing severe 
discomfort and pain.100  The report suggested that additional research was necessary 
because the study was conducted when palliative care education was not available 
and the provision of end-of-life care was inconsistent throughout the country.101  The 
attitudes and choices of patients and physicians might change when palliative care 
becomes readily available and the needs of the patient become a larger factor in the 
medical treatment plan.  The report also stated that current proposals for assisted 
suicide guidelines would bear little relation to the clinical circumstances involving 
physician care for the terminally ill patients.102  Current data indicates that physicians 
are inadequately trained to assess and manage the complex symptoms of pain, that 
are commonly related to a patient’s request for suicide.103  The appropriate and 
aggressive use of pain-relieving drugs is recommended even if the use of the drug 
hastens death.104  There have been improvements in the sensitivity of the medical 
community in relating to the needs and desires of the dying patient.105  Physicians 
have a responsibility to undertake timely and adequate discussions with patients for 
agreement, not only about life-sustaining treatment, but also on how they want to be 
cared for in the terminal stages of life.106  The involvement of the physician in end-
of-life care planning is deficient in part because inadequate training provided to 
medical students.107  Consequently, practitioners may not sufficiently understand or 
                                                                
97Id. at 1199. 
98Id. 
99Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736. 
100See Meier, supra note 89, at 1193. 
101Id. 
102Id. 
103Kathleen M. Foley, Competent Care for the Dying Instead of Physician-Assisted 
Suicide, NEW ENG. J. MED., Jan. 2, 1997, at 55. 
104Sidney H. Wanzer, The Physician’s Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients: A 
Second Look, NEW ENG. J. MED., Mar. 30, 1989, at 844. 
105Id. at 845. 
106Id. at 846. 
107Id. 
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value the role of the terminally ill patient in making decisions about terminal care 
issues.108  
According to American Medical Association reports, only five of the 126 
medical schools in the United States require a course that specifically concentrates 
on palliative care.109  Patients do not have confidence that the health care system will 
take care of the needs of a terminally ill patient; particularly with regard to the care 
necessary to deal with pain.110  Some health care providers have expressed that “there 
is no doubt that the debate and high degree of tolerance shown for assisted suicide 
has been a wake up call to the medical system.”111  
While there is considerable support for the contention that the field of medicine 
has had a long track record of under treating the pain of terminally ill patients, the 
health care community is beginning to respond to the public debate on assisted 
suicide.112  Pain control is now part of many specialty areas of medicine, and experts 
report that ninety-five percent of patients with intractable pain can experience relief 
without intolerable sedation.113  Patients with severe and intractable pain do not have 
to end their life, and palliative care opportunities offer the most crucial element in 
caring to the needs of the terminally ill patient.114  Under current guidelines for 
assisted suicide, the terminally ill patient is the only individual who is permitted the 
choice of ending his or her life.115  
The care of the dying patient is an art that not only prepares the patient to cope 
with the technology of the medical environment; it is an art of deliberately 
developing the circumstances that allow the patient to experience a peaceful death.116  
The physician must balance the inadequate treatment of the dying patient with the 
intolerable use of aggressive life-sustaining procedures in order to achieve a level of 
care that maximizes the comfort and dignity of the dying patient.117 
The humanness of death is not only a matter of avoiding pain and physical 
suffering, it is also about being consistent with the basic values of the patient.118  
Patients fear and resent the experience of death which could be preceded by a period 
of dependency or deterioration.119  Consequently, the World Health Organization has 
                                                                
108Id. 
109See Foley, supra note 103, at 54. 
110Raymond, supra note 4, at 9. 
111Id. 
112Guy Franklin, Physician Assisted Suicide: Misconceptions and Implications From A 
Physician’s Perspective, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 579, 583 (1997). 
113Id.  
114Id. 
115Baron, supra note 94, at 5. 
116See Raymond, supra note 4, at 9. 
117See Foley, supra note 103, at 55. 
118See Brief for Bioethics Professors Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 5, 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae]. 
119Id. 
2000-01] WASHINGTON v. GLUCKSBERG 283 
endorsed palliative care as an integral component of a national health care policy.120  
The World Health Organization has also taken the position that its member countries 
are not to consider the legalization of assisted suicide without having adequately 
addressed the need for pain relief and palliative care.121  There is considerable 
evidence which suggests that a request for assistance in suicide may mask an 
underlying need for pain relief.122 
The goal of palliative care is to relieve suffering and place the utmost importance 
on the quality of the patient’s life.123  Palliative medicine focuses on improving the 
control of pain, and management of the symptoms of the disease, while at the same 
time addressing the psychological needs of patients and families facing a life-
limiting illness.124  Palliative medicine attempts to influence how a patient dies.125  
The terminally ill patient must be prescribed whatever is medically necessary to 
control pain.126 
According to the Massachusetts Medical Society, narcotics or other pain 
medications should be given in whatever dose and by whatever route is necessary for 
relief.127  It further advocates that it is morally appropriate to increase the dosage to 
levels needed even to the point where death is hastened, provided that the primary 
objective of the necessary treatment plan is to relieve pain.128  This result is 
commonly referred to as the double effect.129  The double effect occurs when a 
terminally ill patient, in consultation with a physician, chooses to receive major 
doses of pain-killing drugs under palliative care with knowledge that the treatment 
may, as a secondary effect, result in death.130  Physicians have continuously argued 
that there is a critical difference between the intent of a course of care that results in 
death secondary to the intent of the treatment of pain even when the death is 
foreseeable and the primary intent to assist in a suicide and the intent of 
administering a lethal injection purely because it is lethal.131  The American Medical 
Association Code of Ethics supports the role of the physician using an aggressive 
treatment plan for pain in a palliative care circumstance even when the foreseeable 
result could produce death.132 
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The practice of palliative health care is beginning to evolve; a recent survey by 
the Association of American Medical Colleges reported that 122 of 125 accredited 
medical schools offered end of life studies as part of required medical courses.133  
Fifty of those schools offered separate elective courses focusing on caring for the 
dying patient.134  Health care professionals see that making physicians and nurses 
aware of end of life issues is just the first step.135  The second step is to increase 
awareness and opportunities in the hospital care setting.136  
In the article Life and Death Choices, the author writes about a fifty-two year old 
woman receiving palliative care, and who is dying from cancer of her brain and 
neck.137  The patient was described as a terminally ill patient who had undergone 
multiple surgeries resulting in the removal of part of her jaw and larynx.138  The 
patient had received state of the art radiation therapy, but the progress the disease 
had made would eventually end her life.139  The patient chose palliative medicine to 
help her cope with the progression of her illness.140  She wore a transdermal patch 
which releases an opioid drug into her system over the period of a few days.141  She 
must also take an anti-convulsant drug twice a day to help her control nerve pain.142  
The patient was described as requiring a moderately high dose of morphine to 
effectively manage her pain.143  The patient stated that her pain management care 
plan was working and allowed her to continue the enjoyment of life.144 
The availability of palliative care provides for the relief of severe pain and 
symptom management for the terminally ill patient.   The terminally ill patient 
considers assisted suicide only as a viable alternative to suffering severe pain during 
the final stages of life.  The use of assisted suicide as a means of end of life care will 
be effectively reduced by improvements in palliative care options. The political 
debate on assisted suicide must focus on the needs of the terminally ill patient and 
the choices he or she must make to die with dignity and individual autonomy.  
Viewed from this perspective, the legal and medical community can address the 
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palliative care needs, thereby the assisted suicide choice becomes a less desirable 
option in the care for terminally ill patients.  Assisted suicide is a choice about self 
determination, and terminally ill patients deserve the chance to make an individual 
decision about how and when to die. 
IV.  AN ANALYSIS OF LABORATORY EXPERIMENTATION IN OREGON 
In Glucksberg, Justice O’Connor wrote that the states’ consideration of the 
assisted suicide issue held the challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for 
safeguarding liberty interests that were entrusted to the “laboratory of the States.”145  
The Court in Glucksberg noted that forty-four states, the District of Columbia and 
two territories prohibited, or were against, assisted suicide.146  The right to end life is, 
for now, an issue which has been left for the states to address.147  Currently there is 
only one state, Oregon, that has enacted a statute permitting an individual to 
voluntarily end his or her life.148  Hawaii is currently considering a statute similar to 
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act.149  California’s legislature considered legislation 
permitting assisted suicide; however, the bill never reached the floor for a vote and 
died in committee on February 3, 2000.150 
Oregon’s attempt to address the right to end life issue may represent the answer 
to the questions raised in Glucksberg.  The Court was not able to distinguish which 
set of facts were persuasive enough to determine which side of the assisted suicide 
argument was correct.  The Oregon experiment is the only source of factual data 
available in the United States and it is therefore essential to carefully examine the 
impact on state legislation permitting physician assisted suicide.151 
The Oregon assisted suicide initiative, the Death with Dignity Act, established a 
statutory framework in which a competent terminally ill patient could legally receive 
a prescription of medication for the purpose of ending their life.152  The voters passed 
the ballot issue in November 1994 by a slim margin of fifty-one percent to forty-nine 
percent.  On November 23, 1994, fifteen days before the law was to take effect, a 
suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon delaying 
the implementation of the Death with Dignity Act.153  In Lee v. Oregon, the court 
issued a permanent injunction to prevent the law from taking effect, finding that the 
Act failed to provide sufficient safeguards to prevent an incompetent terminally ill 
adult from committing suicide.154  The court, therefore, concluded that the Act 
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violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.155  On February 27, 1997, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of the Appeals ruled that the distsrict court lacked 
jurisdiction and vacated the injunction imposed by the lower district court.156  On 
October 27, 1997, the injunction was lifted and physician assisted suicide became a 
legal alternative for the terminally ill in Oregon.157  
Glucksberg did not limit the ability of a state to enact provisions for individuals 
to end his or her life by assisted suicide.158  The Court concluded that the state was 
the proper place to decide the end of life liberty issue, and the political process was 
responsible to determine the appropriate safeguards.159  The legal arguments 
presented in Lee led the Oregon legislature to once again bring the assisted suicide 
issue before the voters.160  Subsequently, there was serious concern that the Oregon 
electorate may have changed position after the public and legal debate.161  
Responding to this political possibility, the Oregon Judiciary Committee sponsored a 
legislative bill calling for the repeal of the Death with Dignity Act.162  The Oregon 
Legislative Assembly responded by passing the legislation that brought the repeal of 
assisted suicide issue to the voters in a special election held on November 4, 1997.163  
Oregon voters supported the Act by a wider margin than the previous election, sixty 
percent voting to retain the law against forty percent voting to repeal it.164  
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act is the only such legislation in the United 
States.165  Several circumstances in Oregon may have played a role in the 
development of this one-of-a-kind law.  In 1996, Oregon’s per capita distribution of 
morphine, the drug of choice for use in palliative care, was fifty percent higher than 
the United States average.166  This may have been the result of a greater commitment 
by Oregon working with the medical community to provide better care to the 
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terminally ill patient.167  Oregon law provided protection for physicians prescribing 
controlled substances for the treatment of patients suffering from intractable pain.168  
A 1996 survey of 321 Oregon psychiatrists reported that sixty-six percent supported 
permitting a physician to write a prescription for life ending medication under certain 
circumstances.169  The survey also found that fifty-six percent of the psychiatrists 
were in favor of the Act and seventy-four percent indicated that if they were 
victimized by a terminal illness, they might consider the option of physician assisted 
suicide.170  The report suggested that the medical community within Oregon was 
more supportive of voluntary life termination than in other parts of the country.171  
This possibility may be a result of the progressive nature of care for the terminally ill 
in the state.172  Something different happened in Oregon because it continues to be 
the only state offering assisted suicide.173  Other states may be watching the results of 
Oregon’s experiment, seeing if it fails to adequately address the necessary safeguards 
to protect individuals from undue influence and liberal utilization of assisted suicide. 
Before the implementation of the Death with Dignity Act, a survey on physician 
assisted suicide was conducted by the Massachusetts Medical Society in 1995.174  
The survey rate of response was seventy percent.175  The survey reported that sixty 
percent of the responding physicians thought physician assisted suicide should be 
legal in some instances and found that forty-six percent of the physicians might be 
willing to prescribe a lethal dose of medication if it were legal to do so.176  The 
survey reported that twenty-one percent of the respondents had received requests for 
assisted-suicide and seven percent had indicated that they had complied with the 
request without a law protecting them.177  The results indicated that Oregon 
physicians expressed a higher acceptance of physician assisted suicide than other 
surveyed physicians.178  Seventy-three percent of the responding physicians reported 
that they would refer a patient who requested physician assisted suicide or would 
investigate the possibility of complying with the patient’s request.179  The survey 
found no published information on the effectiveness of drugs and the proper dosage 
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needed to effectively terminate a patients life.180  In Oregon, the only source of 
information found was through the Hemlock Society.181   
The Death with Dignity Act makes it legal for a physician to prescribe lethal 
medication to terminally ill Oregon residents only for self-administration.182  The 
statute continues to provide criminal penalties for individuals who assist others in 
committing suicide.183  The Act legalizes physician assisted suicide while specifically 
prohibiting euthanasia.184  The adult must be at least eighteen years of age and able to 
make and communicate health cares decisions, make a voluntary expression of a 
wish to die, and make a written request for medication for the purpose of ending 
their life in a humane and dignified manner.185  To receive a prescription for lethal 
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____________________________________________________________ 
 
                                   REQUEST FOR MEDICATION 
                                 TO END MY LIFE IN A HUMANE 
                                    AND DIGNIFIED MANNER 
 
                  I, _____________________, am an adult of sound mind. 
                  I am suffering from _________, which my attending physician  
                 has determined is a terminal disease and which has been 
                 medically confirmed by a consulting physician. 
                  I have been fully informed of my diagnosis, prognosis, the 
                 nature of medication to be prescribed and potential associated 
                 risks, the expected result, and the feasible alternatives, 
                 including comfort care, hospice care and pain control. 
                  I request that my attending physician prescribe medication 
                 that will end my life in a humane and dignified manner. 
 
                  INITIAL ONE: 
                  ______ I have informed my family of my decision and taken 
                               their opinions into consideration. 
                  ______ I have decided not to inform my family of my decision. 
                  ______ I have no family to inform of my decision. 
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medication, the patient must make two verbal requests to their physician that are 
separated by at least fifteen days.186  As a final safeguard, the Oregon statute 
provides that no less than fifteen days shall elapse between the patients initial request 
and the writing of the prescription.187  There is an additional requirement that no less 
than forty-eight hours shall elapse between the patient’s written request and the 
issuance of the prescription.188  
In order to monitor compliance with the Death with Dignity Act, the Oregon 
Health Division has incorporated reporting requirements and procedures into 
administrative rules.189  When a physician prescribes the medication to a patient, the 
                                                          
                  I understand that I have the right to rescind this request 
                  at any time. 
                  I understand the full import of this request and I expect 
                  to die when I take the medication to be prescribed. 
                  I make this request voluntarily and without reservation, 
                  and I accept full moral responsibility for my actions. 
 
                   Signed: ______________     Dated : ______________ 
 
 
                                        DECLARATION OF WITNESSES 
 
                  We declare that the person signing this request: 
                  (a) Is personally known to us or has provided proof of 
                       identity; 
                  (b) Signed this request in our presence; 
                  (c) Appears to be of sound mind and not under duress, 
                     fraud or undue influence; 
                  (d) Is not a patient for whom either of us is attending 
                       physician. 
 
                   _____________ Witness 1/Date ______________ 
                   _____________ Witness 2/Date ______________ 
 
                   NOTE: One witness shall not be a relative (by blood, 
                   marriage or adoption) of the person signing this request, 
                   shall not be entitled to any portion of the person's 
                   estate upon death and shall not own, operate or be 
                   employed at a health care facility where the person is a  
                   patient or resident. If the patient is an inpatient at a 
                   health care facility, one of the witnesses shall be an 
                   individual designated by the facility. 
186Id. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.810, § 2.02 (1997).  (The prescribing physician and a 
consulting physician must confirm the diagnosis and prognosis.  Impaired judgment concerns 
must be referred to a psychiatrist or psychologist for counseling. The patient must be informed 
of other alternatives. The prescribing physician must request notification of next of kin, but, 
may not require it. The physician must report all prescriptions written to the Oregon Heath 
Department.). 
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doctor must either submit the required forms to the Health Division or make relevant 
parts of the medical record available to health officials.190  After a patient’s death, the 
death certificate is reviewed against data provided by the required report forms.191  
The Health Division has also developed an interview format for physicians 
participating under the Act.192  The questions were developed in cooperation with the 
Oregon Task Force to Improve the Care of Terminally Ill Oregonians.193  
On February 18, 1999, the Oregon Department of Human Resources, Center for 
Disease Prevention and Epidemiology issued a report: Oregon’s Death with Dignity 
Act: The First Year’s Experience.194  The report covered information on all reported 
patients who received a prescription for lethal medication and died during calendar 
year 1998.195  During 1998, twenty-three individuals received prescriptions for lethal 
medications under the Death with Dignity Act as reported by physicians to the 
Oregon Center for Disease Prevention and Epidemiology.196  The following 
summarizes some of the key findings provided by the report: 
• (A) of the twenty-three reported deaths, fifteen died after taking the lethal 
medication, six died from their underlying illness, and two were alive on 
January 1, 2000;197  
• (B) twenty of the patients had been residents of Oregon for longer than six 
months when they received their prescriptions;198  
• (C) eighteen of the deceased patients suffered from cancer;199  
• (D) twenty of the patients were prescribed nine grams of secobarbital or 
penobarbital combined with a number of non lethal prescriptions to be used in 
conjunction with the lethal medication;200 
• (E) the median time from taking the oral medication to unconsciousness was 
five minutes and the median time to death was twenty-six minutes.  No 
complications such as vomiting or seizures were reported;201 
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• (F) none of the patients expressed concern to their physicians about the financial 
impact of their illness;202 
• (G) the patients prescribed the lethal medications were more likely than the 
control group used to express concern about loss of autonomy or loss of control 
of bodily functions;203 
• (H) the study found no evidence to support the concern that voluntary suicide 
would be used more by the poor, uneducated, or uninsured terminally ill 
patient.204  
One interesting observation identified in the study was the consistency of the 
amount of drugs prescribed by the physicians.205  The report attributes this to the 
availability of this information through advocacy groups such as the Hemlock 
Society.206  The report also discovered that fourteen of the fifteen patients did not 
express concern about pain control at the end of life, which may have been 
attributable to the quality of palliative care available in Oregon.207  Oregon ranks 
among the top five states in per capita use of morphine for medical purposes that 
statistic is often used as a measure of the extent to which palliative care is 
available.208  The report also found that the patients were concerned about controlling 
the time of their death.209  The report stated: “many physicians reported that their 
patients had been decisive and independent throughout their lives or that the decision 
to request the lethal prescription was consistent with a long held belief about the 
importance of controlling the manner in which they died.”210  The Oregon advocacy 
group, Compassion In Dying, reported, according to its records, fifty-nine patients 
had contacted the group since the Oregon law passed and indicated assisted suicide 
was under consideration.211  The group reported that thirty-eight of those contacts 
had died, eleven by assisted suicide, and five by receiving high doses of morphine 
for pain as a result of the double practice.212 
While many groups opposed to assisted suicide would prefer that the terminally 
ill person in Oregon would not chose assisted suicide, most groups agree that the law 
was implemented with care and thoughtfulness.213  One of the key elements under the 
Oregon statue that makes assisted suicide more acceptable to the public is the patient 
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must take the medication without help from a third party.214  This feature lessens the 
possibility of undue influence or other influences upon a person’s choice to end their 
life.215  Some acknowledge that the Oregon law gives residents of the state one more 
option among many others at the end of life.216 
Health care practitioners in the field of end of life care express that the law is 
working well and there has been an overall improvement in the care of dying in 
Oregon since the first initiative was voted into law in 1994.217  The reason Oregon 
has been the experimental ground for assisted suicide may be found in the fact that 
thirty percent of the deaths in the state had hospice support compared with nineteen 
percent nationally.218   Only thirty percent of terminally ill patients die in hospitals, 
which is a much lower rate than any other state.219  This would indicate greater 
availability and acceptance of palliative care of patients in their natural home 
environment.220  Many of the major hospitals in Oregon have been found to have 
established strong pain management programs since Glucksberg.221  After enactment 
of the Death with Dignity Act, referrals to hospice programs increased 
significantly.222  Additionally, physicians increased the use of morphine and other 
pain control medications which improve the end of life care and treatment of the 
terminally ill patient.223 
The successful implementation of a physician assisted suicide statute requires 
well defined guidelines.  The Oregon statute has existed for two years and early 
indications are that the statute is meeting the needs of the terminally ill patient in 
Oregon.224  The success of the Oregon statute can be traced to several factors.  First, 
the detailed guidelines provided by the statute reduces any serious doubts physicians 
may have concerning the legality of prescribing lethal medication.225  Second, the 
enactment of a statute eliminates the need for a physician to practice assisted suicide 
in secret and will enable the physician to take part in public discussions, which will 
enable public debate of the medical and legal issues.226  Third, terminally ill patients 
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will no longer need to seek assisted suicide without adequate information about other 
health care options.227  Fourth, terminally ill patients will not be as likely to chose to 
end their life early for fear that the choice may not be available at a later time.228  
Finally, the law allows for patients to die in the presence of loved ones instead of in 
isolation.229  
The Oregon Death with Dignity statute provides the terminally ill patient another 
important health care option in the final stages of life.  Physician assisted suicide 
accounted for approximately five of every 10,000 deaths in Oregon in 1998, which 
represented no abnormality in the state suicide rate.230  The choice of assisted dying 
did not open a flood gate for people to start committing suicide.  In fact the converse 
is true, the individual selecting assisted dying in Oregon made the decision after 
careful consideration of the choices while under the consultation of his or her 
physician.231  The Oregon experience supports the contention that the terminally ill 
patient requires a comprehensive choice of medical care options in order to 
effectively manage the final stages of death.  The Oregon law is also credited with 
causing a significant increase in the terminally ill patient’s choice of hospice care 
and providing a valuable model for other states to use in addressing the assisted 
dying option.  Assisted suicide is merely one choice available to the terminally ill 
patient and will most likely be the preferred choice of medical care that helps the 
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suicide act.  In 1995, two bills were introduced to the legislature, again modeled after the 
Oregon Death with Dignity Act.  The proposed Act was referred to the Assembly Judiciary 
Committee without further action by the California Assembly.  A second attempt to legalize 
assisted suicide was made on November 3, 1992, when the voters of California rejected 
Proposition 161 which would have allowed either administration of lethal medications by the 
physician or patient.  Proposition 161 was rejected by voters by a margin of fifty-four percent 
to forty-six percent.  The proposition included the administration of medication by the 
physician which may have contributed to the voters rejection.  
Hawaii is currently considering a legislative proposal for physician assisted suicide also 
modeled after the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.  Hawaii House Bill 1155 was introduced on 
January 27, 1999, and was referred to two legislative committees.  On February 6, 1999, the 
Hawaii House Committee on Health voted by a margin of seven to zero to hold the bill in 
committee.  The bill is still active and has been carried over to the 2000 Regular Session.). 
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patient die with dignity and control.  Assisted suicide is a medical option and not a 
criminal act. 
V.  THE SOCIAL DEBATE ON ASSISTED SUICIDE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act and other similar legislative proposals are 
not without legal challenges.  End of life care issues came under intense scrutiny 
while the Companion In Dying and Quill cases worked through the judicial 
system.232  Advocates on both sides of the assisted suicide issue brought vast 
amounts of information before the Glucksberg Court which ultimately impacted not 
only the general public, but also influenced legislative leaders at the state and federal 
levels.  One national study on physician assisted suicide reported that regulatory 
guidelines that are used by legislatures to draft end of life care and assisted suicide 
statutes may have limited relationships to the actual clinical experiences under which 
physicians care for the terminally ill patient.233  Federal legislation on palliative care 
will have a significant impact on how well the medical needs of the terminally ill 
patient are addressed by the medical community. 
The first federal response to the assisted suicide issue involved attempts to 
invalidate the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.  On November, 11 1997, Thomas K. 
Constantine, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency [hereinafter 
“DEA”], authored a letter representing that the DEA would consider a prescription of 
a drug under the Oregon Act as a violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act 
because the prescription would not serve a legitimate medical purpose.234  As a 
result, the Oregon Medical Society advised physicians to refrain from prescribing 
lethal medications under the act.235  On June 5, 1998, Attorney General Janet Reno 
issued a letter to U.S. Representative Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee advising him that “adverse action against a physician who assisted in 
suicide in full compliance with the Oregon Act would not be authorized by the 
Controlled Substances Act.”236  Attorney General Reno justified her position based 
upon the premise that the intent of the Controlled Substances Act was to keep legally 
available controlled substances in legal channels of distribution for use while 
preventing illegal trafficking.237  She stated that there was no congressional intent to 
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234Letter from Henry Hyde, U.S. Representative, to Thomas K. Constantine, Administrator 
of the Drug Enforcement Agency (July 7, 1998), available at 
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supersede state authority to regulate the medical profession or override a state 
determination of a legitimate medical practice.238  
On the same day the Attorney General issued her letter, Henry Hyde introduced 
the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998 to the House of Representatives.239  
The purpose of the Act was to prohibit the dispensing or distributing of a controlled 
substance for the purpose of causing, or assisting in causing, the suicide of any 
individual.240  The proposed legislation exempted from prohibition the use of 
controlled substance for the purpose of pain management even if its use increased the 
risk of death.241 
The Act placed the burden of proof on the prosecutor, using a clear and 
convincing evidence standard, to establish that the practitioner’s intent was to cause 
a death or assist in causing a death.242  The legislation was the first attempt at the 
federal level to negate the Oregon assisted suicide statute.243 
Hearings on the bill were conducted by the Judiciary Committee in July 1998. 244  
In August, the Committee issued its report on the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act 
of 1998 and recommended passage of the Act.245  The report indicated that the bill 
would affirm, for the first time, within the Controlled Substances Act, the use of 
controlled substances for pain management as a legitimate medical purpose, 
exempting practitioners from penalties under the law.246  The committee reported that 
the bill would make a clear distinction between the medical practice of pain 
management which increased the risk of death and the practice of assisted suicide.247  
The committee report stated that the need for legislation was due to the use of 
controlled substances in Oregon under the Death with Dignity Act and the ruling by 
Attorney General Reno to exclude the Oregon law from the jurisdiction of the 
DEA.248  The report went on to emphasize three critical reasons for the proposed 
legislation.249  First, the bill would reaffirm the legal prohibition and ethical rejection 
of the intentional causing of another individual’s death.250  Second, the legislation 
would apply “social brakes” to a destructive trend toward assisted suicide.251  And 
                                                                
238Id. 
239H.R. REP. NO. 105-683, Part 1, at 2 (1998). 
240H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998). 
241H.R. REP. NO. 105-683, supra note 239, at 3. 
242H.R. 4006, supra note 240, at § 2(a)(i)(2). 
243H.R. REP. NO. 105-683, supra note 239, at 4. 
244Id. at 1. 
245Id. 
246Id. at 3. 
247Id. at 8. 
248H.R. REP. NO. 105-683, supra note 239, at 6. 
249Id. at 4. 
250Id. 
251Id. 
296 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 15:271 
finally, the Act continued to provide the essential supports for the appropriate use of 
controlled substances for pain management.252  The Judiciary Committee report 
openly identified, as did the language of the bill, that the bill was designed to reverse 
the decision of the voters of Oregon to pass the assisted suicide law.253  This 
legislation raised important concerns about the right of the state to control the 
practice of medicine that could be superseded by federal laws controlling the use of 
drugs.254  The Act never reached the House floor for a vote and died in committee.255 
In June 1999, Hyde introduced the Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999 to the 
106th Congress.256  The Act would provide for the alleviation of pain or discomfort 
by amending the Controlled Substance Abuse Act and by making the dispensing of 
medications for treatment a legitimate medical purpose even if use increased the risk 
of death.257  The bill would clarify that nothing in the Controlled Substance Abuse 
Act authorized the use of controlled substances for the purposes of assisted 
suicide.258  The legislation outlined that the Controlled Substance Abuse Act did not 
authorize intentional dispensing, distribution, or administration of a controlled 
substance for the purpose of causing the death or assisting another person in dying.259 
The Act would invalidate state laws that permit assisted suicide, such as in the 
State of Oregon, by requiring that the Attorney General give no force and effect to 
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important point to consider is that the Oregon first year experience report was not available 
when the committee report was released on August 6, 1998.  Many of the points argued in the 
committee report were the same arguments brought before the Supreme Court in Washington 
v. Glucksberg.  Congress has taken up the cause to prohibit assisted suicide at same time the 
Supreme Court expressed support for state experimentation.  The issue of overriding the 
voters’ choice in Oregon was raised by eight members of the judicial committee in their 
opposition to the recommendation for passage of the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act.  The 
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state law authorizing or permitting assisted-suicide or euthanasia.260  The Act 
effectively overrides Attorney General Reno’s decision of June 5, 1998 to not 
interfere with the Oregon voters’ passage of the Death with Dignity Act.261  On 
October 27, 1999, the bill passed in the House of Representatives, by a vote of 271-
156, and was introduced in the Senate on November 19, 1999, and referred to the 
Judiciary Committee.262 
The Act would make the dispensing of a controlled substance for the purpose of 
intentional ending life a violation of federal law, regardless of whether or not it 
violated state law.263  Physician survey results suggest that many physicians currently 
prescribe controlled substances for causing death in the course of treatment of the 
terminally ill patient.264  The Act would provide medical practitioners protection only 
when controlled substances are used for appropriate pain relief.265  The Act provides 
several programs and grants intending to develop and advance scientific 
understanding of palliative care.266 
The proposed legislation would end the Oregon experience with assisted 
suicide.267  The Act would also have a serious impact on palliative care because the 
line between acceptable palliative care and illegal assistance with suicide would rest 
solely upon the intent of the physician.268  A subjective basis for interpretation could 
make the application of the law very difficult with regard to physician treatment 
decisions at the end of life and could threaten the ability of doctors to improve the 
quality of palliative care by discouraging aggressive and appropriate treatment of 
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pain.269  The drug of choice under the Oregon Death with Dignity Act has been 
Secobarbital and Phenobarbital which are classified as Schedule IV drugs under the 
Controlled Substances Act.270  Therefore, passage of the Pain Relief Promotion Act 
of 1999 would in effect make the Oregon statute illegal under federal law.271 
Physicians would be reluctant to change the type of drugs used in assisted suicide 
because there is no source available to provide information on reliable alternatives.272 
The Judiciary Committee report outlined the possibility of a constitutional state 
rights issue caused by modifying the Controlled Substance Abuse Act.273  Members 
of the Committee argued that the Act was a federal intrusion of the states’ right to 
regulate medical care.274  The concern for many legislators was that the Act overrode 
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act; thirteen members of the committee concluded 
that the 1999 bill disregarded the Supreme Court’s ruling in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, authorizing and encouraging the states to engage in meaningful debate 
and experiment in the case of assisted-suicide.275  During testimony before the 
Judiciary Committee, many commentators recommended consideration of other, 
more appropriate Legislative proposals before Congress.276 
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276Id.  (The Pain Promotion Relief Act was referred to two House Subcommittees for 
study.  The House Committee on Commerce issued a report on the Pain Relief Promotion Act 
in October 1999.  The Committee recommended passage of the bill, taking the position that it 
clarified the standard that controlled substances used for the intention of assisting suicide 
where not authorized under the Controlled Substances Act.  The committee also reported that 
in implementing the Act, the Attorney General must employ a uniform standard in 
enforcement of the Act without regard to state laws that permit assisted suicide instead of 
euthanasia.  The Committee supported the invalidation of the Oregon assisted suicide statute.  
The Committee on Commerce conducted no hearings and rejected an attempt to insert the 
provisions of another palliative care bill, the Conquering Pain Act of 1999 in place of the Pain 
Promotion Relief Act.  
The bill had not gone through the appropriate committee process.  Members of the 
Committee expressed concern about the lack of hearings on the important issues of assisted 
suicide and palliative care.  These Committee members justified recommending passage 
without hearing because of the considerable number of medically related organizations 
opposed to the legislation.  The Committee qualified the recommendation stating that this 
contentious area of public policy demands careful subcommittee consideration and expert 
testimony by educated witnesses.  The report also expressed concern about second guessing by 
the Drug Enforcement Administration over the “intent and purpose” of physician care for a 
terminally ill patient.  The committee identified, as others had suggested, that the conduction 
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In May 1999, Senator Ron Wyden introduced the Conquering Pain Act of 1999 
to the U.S. Senate.277  This legislative proposal has no reference to the Oregon Death 
with Dignity Act and takes no federal action to override that law.278  The legislative 
approach in this bill is to singularly address the palliative care issue without any 
attempt to amend the Controlled Substances Act.279  The Act amends the Public 
Health Service Act in order to establish a method of dealing with the public health 
crisis of pain.280  Pain has been identified as a major public health problem in the 
United States estimated fifty million Americans are partially or totally disabled by 
chronic pain.281  The Act requires the development of an internet web site for the 
purpose of providing evidence-based practice guidelines for pain management.282  
The proposal also requires the Medicaid and Medicare programs to inform 
individuals what to expect under pain management care.283  The Act directs the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to determine how to include measurements 
of pain and symptom management in the Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal 
medical programs.284 
Other provisions of the Act authorize funding to implement special education 
projects by peer review organizations to improve pain and symptom management 
care.285  The Act mandates grants to health care provider training facilities for the 
establishment of six national family support networks in pain and symptom 
management.  Most importantly, the proposed legislation authorizes a study and 
report to the Senate on ways federal insurance programs may provide palliative care 
services.286  The bill mandates grants to establish at least five demonstration projects 
on effective methods to measure improvement in the skills and knowledge of health 
care pain and systems management.287  In October 1999, the Senate Committee on 
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Health Education, Labor, and Pensions held hearings but, there had been no other 
reported activity by the Senate.288 
In March 1999, Senator John D. Rockefeller introduced the Advance Planning 
and Compassionate Care Act of 1999 to the U.S. Senate.289  The Compassionate Care 
Act would amend the Social Security Act by requiring the development of outcome 
standards and measures to evaluate programs that provide end of life care.290  The 
Act also requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to report evaluation 
findings, including an annual Medicare report on the quality of end of life care, to 
Congress.291  The Act would establish a central clearinghouse and a twenty-four 
hour-toll free telephone hotline to provide information to individuals making end of 
life  medical care decisions.292  The Act also requires that the Medicaid program 
provide coverage of self-administered prescription drugs for relief of pain to 
terminally ill patients.293 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The State of Oregon may ultimately make a constitutional challenge in the event 
the Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999 becomes law.  The challenge may be based 
on the premise that the Act impinges on traditional state powers to regulate medicine 
and physicians.  The political debate has had a positive impact on health care for the 
terminally ill patient.  One of the legislative proposals for palliative care will 
eventually pass and Congress, with a presidential approval, become law.  Each 
proposal before Congress underscores the pain management crisis in the United 
States.  Palliative care legislation as a recognized end of life option is finally coming 
of age. 
Many federal legislators, however, interpret assisted suicide as a direct assault 
upon the ability of Congress to efficiently control drug usage.  Noting this, the Pain 
Relief Promotion Act of 1999 has simply rearranged the priorities first outlined in 
the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 1998. The 1999 version is aimed at 
invalidating the Oregon assisted suicide statute.  Some members of Congress have 
the intent of insuring that the assisted suicide experiment never takes place in any 
other state, while eliminating the current law in Oregon.  States’ rights proponents 
are concerned that any federal legislation against assisted suicide would represent 
misuse of Congressional authority to regulate drugs.294  The Controlled Substances 
Abuse Act was designed to control drug abuse, not to define the medical uses of 
drugs.  This is not the direction suggested by Justice O’Connor when she offered the 
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premise that the question should be addressed in the “laboratory of the states.”295  
Assisted suicide is a means for states to provide individuals greater choice in end of 
life care.  These decisions should be left up to each state to decide, free from 
Congressional influence and obstruction.  On February 29, 2000, the State of Oregon 
released a second year report required under the Death with Dignity Act.296  This 
may provide advocates on both sides of the assisted suicide issue more information 
so that better end of life decisions can be made for the terminally ill patient.  Assisted 
suicide is an end of life care choice that many patients need so they may die with 
dignity and self-determination. 
PHILIP KING 
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